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Abstract. E-Mail tracking uses personalized links and pictures for gathering in-
formation on user behavior, for example, where, when, on what kind of device, 
and how often an e-mail has been read. This information can be very useful for 
marketing purposes. On the other hand, privacy and security requirements of 
customers could be violated by tracking. This paper examines how e-mail track-
ing works, how it can be detected automatically, and to what extent it is used in 
German e-commerce. We develop a detection model and software tool in order 
to collect and analyze more than 600 newsletter e-mails from companies of sev-
eral different industries. The results show that the usage of e-mail tracking in 
Germany is prevalent but also varies depending on the industry. 
Keywords: E-Mail Tracking, Online Marketing, Privacy  
1 Introduction 
In modern e-commerce, customer data has become critical for business success [12]. 
Business Intelligence based on personalization is used to optimize market positions, 
to engage in price discrimination [22], and to recommend users products they might 
buy in the future. Tracking user behavior is an important aspect of online marketing 
[22]. This does not only affect users browsing a commercial web site and actually 
looking for specific products. Tracking is also used in emails and has become a pow-
erful instrument for marketing and personalization [2]. E-mail communication is an 
important marketing channel since it is still widely and frequently used. Moreover, it 
is a cheap and time-efficient medium because an e-mail only has to be designed once 
and can afterwards spread fast and to many users in parallel with low costs [6, p. 19]. 
Thus, e-mails are an important way to inform users and try to influence buying deci-
sions. But how can companies ensure that users actually read e-mails and receive 
marketing information? 
E-Mail tracking enables them to remotely observe, for instance, if an e-mail is 
opened, the time when a user reads an e-mail, the program in which the user opens it, 
and could also identify links on which the user clicks [9, p. 316]. This information is 
very useful for a company in order to understand customer behavior in more depth. 
Tracking data can also be sold to data aggregators or other companies that are inter-
ested in enriching their own data on consumers and their behavior. In particular, data 
on actively used e-mail addresses is so valuable that some companies even specialize 
in this business segment and are selling such addresses. 
All of this could create massive privacy concerns on the consumer side, in particular 
with privacy-sensitive users [3]. Our paper investigates how important tracking tech-
niques work, how they can be detected, and to what extent they are used by online 
businesses in Germany. 
2 E-Mail Tracking: Literature and Technology 
In the following we discuss related work. In technical literature, some work has 
been conducted on email tracking in the sense of assessing whether an e-mail has 
been delivered successfully [19] [21]. This includes tracking in the sense of technical-
ly tracing the forwarding of mail through different hosts, including extensions of the 
mail protocols in Requests of Comments (RFCs) such as RFC 3798, RFC 3461, and 
RFCs 3885-3887 [19, p. 17]. With Message Disposition Notification (MDN) [17], the 
sender can request an acknowledgement of mail reception or reading from the receiv-
er. From a perspective of privacy it is important to note that the receiver can choose if 
such an acknowledgement is sent or not [20, p. 131]. 
Other literature discusses tracking in the sense of snooping on mails for extracting 
content from a mail conversation or transmission without being an intended or author-
ized recipient [9, p. 307], or for grouping and combining related content [4] [10]. 
Sometimes tracking also refers to determining the real-world position of a person or 
device [8] [20, p. 131], or the linking of e-mail addresses to real-world identities, and 
is also related to security and privacy issues of using e-mail addresses for identifica-
tion [13] [18]. The term e-mail tracking is sometimes also used in the sense of identi-
fying the location of an e-mail as intangible object in a complex messaging network, 
for example, in the context of designing new decentralized mail architectures, e.g., 
involving peer-to-peer concepts [7] [14]. 
In our paper, e-mail tracking is understood as the remote logging of e-mail opening 
or reading, typically without user notice or consent. For this specific use of the term 
the following sources could be identified in the literature. The term e-mail tracking is 
explained by [11], including an example how a specific large company uses an e-mail 
tracking service. In [19, p. 17] an external service is described which generates a link 
for the e-mail content and sends that link to the receiver who needs to click on it in 
order to retrieve the mail content; this access is logged. Such an approach is very 
similar to the tracking link method described below but does not seem practical for 
everyday e-mail usage. In [20] the reaction of common mail software and providers to 
tracking pixels is investigated. 
In contrast, our paper focuses on empirical investigation of the senders of tracking 
mails. Our goal is to assess to what extent e-mail tracking is used by companies in 
different industries. In our paper, two principle methods of tracking in e-mails are 
considered: tracking links and tracking pixels. Both approaches are based on person-
alization. The sender places a piece of content, addressed by a personalized link, or a 
picture with a receiver-specific name on a web server and includes the corresponding 
link in the mail. When the receiver opens the mail, he or she accesses the content, 
either by downloading the picture from the web server or by opening a personalized 
link in the mail. This access is logged by the web server and can be associated with 
the receiver’s customer profile. From now on, identifiers such as IP addresses and 
cookies, or more advanced web browser ”fingerprinting” can be applied for further 
personalized tracking [1] [24], even across different web sites [16]. 
 
 
Fig. 1. How e-mail tracking works 
Figure 1 illustrates these two main forms of e-mail tracking. When applying the track-
ing link method, the sender of an e-mail includes one or several links that refer to 
additional relevant content. Such a link has at least two components: an identifier for 
the content and an identifier for the receiver. These two components could also be 
combined into a single identifier. It is important that the user-identifying component 
is unique or that the combination of content identifier and user identifier is unique. 
The following example link contains an identifier for the content, the cid (content ID), 
and an identifier for the recipient of the mail, the uid (user ID): 
http://www.example.com/content/view.php?cid=218471248&uid=38jd38
29d1. The (combined) uniqueness requirement is important. If the same content will 
be referred to in another mail for another tracking target, the content ID can be reused 
and only a new user ID needs to be assigned.  
After sending, the mail gets transferred to the outgoing mail server of the sender 
(1). The sender’s mail server then attempts to transfer the mail to the receiver’s mail 
server (2). Once this is successfully completed, the client can synchronize or down-
load (depending on the protocol) the mail from the incoming mail server (3). After 
opening the mail, the user might click on links that are included in the mail (4.2). 
When the receiver opens the link and downloads the referred content from the server, 
this access is logged by the web server and can be associated with the receiver 
through the identifiers described above. 
The tracking pixel method is also referred to as ”web bug” method in privacy liter-
ature on web-user tracking [15]. It archetypically represents a stealthy tracking ap-
proach that can be transferred to new technology such as RFID [5]. Here, the sender 
of an e-mail includes a reference to a very small, usually invisible picture in the mail. 
Typically this picture does not have any border, has a width and height of 1 pixel, and 
is transparent or at least has the same color as the background. It is also called a ”pix-
el” because usually those images are in 1x1 format. To apply this technique, the Uni-
form Resource Locator (URL) of the picture needs to be unique. One way of realizing 
this is to assign a unique file name to the picture: <img 
src=http://www.example.com/media/images/FI3RTG0-DOJFD3280.gif>. 
Once the sender has included a reference to the tracking picture, which is stored on 
a web server with a logging software (0), the mail is sent. The intermediate steps are 
the same as described above. When the receiver opens the mail on at least one device, 
the mail client displays the message and usually automatically downloads the refer-
enced picture from the web server (4.1). This download access will be logged and, 
due to the unique identifier (typically the name), can be associated with the e-mail. 
In practice, some problems may arise because many mail clients and providers of-
fer options to block the download of external images [20]. However, users who would 
like to see other images referenced by the mail could also, inadvertently and without 
informed consent, download the tracking pixel once they choose to override this pro-
tection manually. This version of e-mail tracking only works if the mail was sent in 
the common HTML format. 
Both techniques rely on the same principle of logging an access to a file on a web 
server. A client needs to use an application for accessing this file. The tracking link 
method triggers the client’s default browser, whereas the tracking pixel approach uses 
an integrated HTML viewer. Both clients send some general information to the web 
server, for example, the application name and the device platform (from the User-
Agent-String) [20, p. 131]. 
Furthermore, the client’s IP address is transmitted, which allows to draw interest-
ing conclusions for example about the location of the mail receiver and his or her 
Internet service provider. Another logged information is the access timestamp. By 
combining multiple log entries concerning the same file, the number of times a file 
was accessed and, therefore, how often an e-mail was viewed by the specific recipient 
can be derived. In general, file access itself gives the information that the e-mail was 
successfully delivered and opened by the client, and can be used for in-depth analyses 
of consumer behaviour [20, p. 130]. 
When applying the tracking link method, logging takes place at the moment a cus-
tomer actively clicks on a link included in the mail. As a result, opening a link is a 
confirmation that a mail was read. With the tracking pixel method, the logging pro-
cess is triggered when the mail client downloads the tiny picture to display the mes-
sage which takes place when a customer opens the mail with his client. The combina-
tion of both methods could therefore improve data quality about a user’s preference. 
3 Experimental Design 
In order to develop a detection method for tracking mails, and to compare several 
businesses with respect to their use of tracking, e-mails from different industry sectors 
had to be gathered. We chose not to use the content of our own personal e-mail in-
boxes because they may be biased by our personal interests and behaviour. Instead, 
two new e-mail accounts were created at the same mail provider. This enabled com-
parison of links and ensured that there is a double check if both accounts receive simi-
lar e-mails. Both e-mail accounts shared the same properties except for a variation of 
the first name of the user. Other factors such as e-mail provider, age, and country 
were kept identical. 
Both new e-mail addresses were used for registering to the same newsletters. It had to 
be ensured that enough e-mails would be received and that for every industry several 
companies would be selected. In total, 16 different industries were used, each includ-
ing four different companies. Due to the fact that Trade industry is a very broad defi-
nition, it was sub-divided into the four sub-categories All (selling any kind of prod-
uct), Clothes, Electronic and Furniture. The second e-mail address was used for com-
parison in order to investigate variations and to analyze the accuracy of the detection 
model. Table 1 gives an overview on the industries that have been investigated. After 
registration, for a five-month period from the end of 2013, companies were able to 
send newsletter e-mails, a selection of which we first analyzed manually by inspecting 
the HTML code. 
Table 1. Overview of different industries and selected companies 
No. Industry Representative companies 
1 E-Mail Germany Telekom GMX Web.de Freenet 
2 Tourism Expedia Ab-in-den-Urlaub Holidaycheck Travel 24 
3 Trading: All Amazon Ebay Meinpaket Otto 
4 Trading: Clothes Esprit S. Oliver Tommy Hilfiger Kik24 
5 Trading: Electronic Alternate Hardwareversand Media Markt Saturn 
6 Trading: Furniture IKEA XXXL Lutz Höffner Möbel Boss 
7 Healthcare Bayer Siemens Healthcare GE Healthcare Pfizer 
8 Telecommunication Vodafone Mobilcom Debitel Simyo T-Mobile 
9 Food Vapiano Block House McDonald’s Burger King 
10 IT SAP Sage SalesForce Lexware 
11 Estate Liegenschaftsfond Immobilien Newsticker Immobilienscout 24 Immowelt 
12 Credit AXA Allianz Sparkasse Deutsche Bank 
13 Automotive Audi BMW Mercedes Benz Toyota 
14 Energy EnBw RWE Vattenfall E-on 
15 Education Berlitz Lehrer online Scoyo SGD 
16 Culture Cinemaxx Deutsche Oper That’s musical Eventim 
 
3.1 Detection Criteria 
In our initial manual HTML code review, we analyzed every link and picture of 51 
randomly selected mails. This enabled the possibility for comprehensive comparison 
of tracking techniques across industries and companies. Our code review in combina-
tion with input from the literature research constituted criteria for detecting e-mail 
tracking. For a tracking pixel, its border, width, and height are important properties. 
With tracking links, keywords such as the personal account name or the service pro-
vider are indicators. In addition, the difference between manual and automatic link 
creation is an important criterion. This is induced by observing patterns in a pixel 
description or link, e.g., a change between upper and lower case or from characters to 
numbers and vice versa. 
Table 2. Explanation of criteria 
Criterion Explanation 
Switch between 
 upper and lower case 
Switching between upper and lower cases could indicate that this reference 




Switch from  
characters to numbers 
and vice versa 
Switching between characters and numbers could also indicate that this refer-




Border of 0 displays the picture without any border, which makes it hard to 
detect for the user.  
<img src=3D 
"http://www.example.com/g.html?uid=3DA.H.jwu.IU1w.CLk.3XmsTz
remYG9OSEEMy4VT=Q" alt=3D"" border=3D"0" height=3D"1" 
width=3D"1" /> 
Width=1 
Width of 1 ensures that the image is small enough to prevent noticing.  
<img src=3D 
"http://www.example.com/g.html?uid=3DA.H.jwu.IU1w.CLk.3XmsTz
remYG9OSEEMy4VT=Q" alt=3D"" border=3D"0" height=3D"1" 
width=3D"1" /> 
Height=1 
Height of 1 ensures that the image is small enough to prevent noticing. 
<img src=3D 
"http://www.example.com/g.html?uid=3DA.H.jwu.IU1w.CLk.3XmsTz
remYG9OSEEMy4VT=Q" alt=3D"" border=3D"0" height=3D"1" 
width=3D"1" /> 
Keywords such as 
”track”, ”code”, ser-
vice provider, or  
e-mail account 
In addition, keywords such as ”track” or the user’s mail account name are used.  
<img src=3D"https://tracking.example.com/op/0/XSPYOM6-
XAZKIEC-145S7FE.gif" width=3D"1" height=3D"1" /> 
 
A limitation of using image width or height is that if both values are modified, for 
instance, to 2, the threshold of 1 would not be matched and a tracking attempt could 
be missed. Correspondingly, an additional picture criterion ”area” was introduced. 
Area calculates the product of height and width, and if the result is less than 10, the 
criterion is matched. As a further threshold, we require that a switch between upper 
and lower case or a switch between characters and numbers is used more often than 
twice. This allows for strings such as ”Word2014” without triggering a tracking flag. 
With keywords, the identification model was configured to require three or more 
keyword occurrences in order to identify tracking. The following table summarizes 
the final criteria. 





Switch between upper and lower case: 3+ times X X 
Switch from characters and numbers and vice versa: 3+ 
times 
X X 
Border=0  X 
Width=1  X 
Height=1  X 
Keywords, e.g., ”track”, ”code”, mail account: 3+  X 
 
3.2 Detection Model 
In the next step, the discovered criteria have been weighted (Tables 4 and 5). This 
reflects that some criteria are stronger indicators for tracking than others. This insight 
is based on the manual code review which showed that some values are used more 
often than others. As a consequence, the two switches between upper and lower case 
and characters and numbers are always included. 
Table 4. Criteria weights for tracking link 
Criterion Weight 
Switch between upper and lower case: 3+ 30 
Switch from characters and numbers and vice versa: 3+ 40 
Keywords: 3+ 30 
Sum 100 
Table 5. Criteria weights for tracking pixel 
Criterion Weight 
Switch between upper and lower case: 3+ 30 




Area <10 40 
Sum 200 
The criteria and their weights were used to evaluate whether a tracking link or pix-
el is used or not. In general, if more than 60% of the identified criteria are matched, a 
link or pixel is considered a tracking attempt.  
The following example illustrates the model and its usage. Assume that the HTML 
code of a pixel in one of the received e-mail contains the following: <img src=3D 
“http://www.example.com/g.html?uid=3DA.H.jwu.IU1wCLk.3XmsTzremY 
G9osEeMy4VT=Q" alt=3D"" height=3D"4" width=3D"1"/>. There are 
switches between upper and lower cases, even more than three times; thus, the first 
criterion is fulfilled. The next criterion, switches between characters and numbers, is 
also satisfied. The criterion border cannot be determined and is therefore not included 
in the model. However, the height is not 1 and thus this criterion does not match the 
threshold (height=3D”4”). But the criterion width is fulfilled (width=3D”1”). 
Moreover, criterion area is also satisfied because height is 4 and width is 1, which 
means area is 4, i.e., less than 10. The identification model is now used to evaluate 
whether this example is considered a tracking pixel or not. From the possible six crite-
ria, five were found. This means a base score of 190. Out of these five criteria, four 
matched the criteria of the identification model. Summing up, the weight of these four 
is 150. In a next step, 150 is divided by 190, resulting in 0.79, which is higher than 
0.6, and thus this picture is identified as a tracking pixel. 
In summary, the manual code review is using the following approach: read every 
single e-mail manually, copy its links and pixels into a different file and compare for 
matching criteria of the identification model. This process renders the manual identi-
fication of tracking e-mails too time intensive for any larger-scale analysis. Therefore, 
we developed a software prototype to support the detection of email tracking. 
4 Detection Prototype 
The fundamental functionality of our detection prototype is the analysis of emails and 
its content, especially the mail source code. Our detection prototype is written in Java. 
Java is portable to any hardware, therefore the prototype could in theory run on any 
device which is able to execute a Java machine. The detection prototype is currently 
limited to only analyze e-mails from GMail, a web-hosted mail service offered by 
Google. 
The following list describes the functions executed by our program: 
1. The program asks the user for a valid combination of a user name and password. 
This combination is needed by GMail to access the user’s e-mail account. 
2. After the successful login to GMail, for which the Internet Message Access Proto-
col (IMAP) Application Programming Interface (API) is used, the program is ac-
cessing e-mails of the user account and starts to analyze them according to the 
identification model described earlier. 
3. The program identifies e-mails in which either a tracking link or a tracking pixel 
was found and flags them with a star in the GMail inbox (Fig. 2). 
4. It also displays a short analysis screen where the number of tracking links and 
tracking pixels is shown. 
5. In addition, the program creates a log file in which every e-mail with a tracking 
approach is analyzed with respect to sender’s location. The algorithm compares the 
sender’s server location with a tracking link or a tracking pixel in the same e-mail. 
By this, the program investigates if the sender uses a different location for sending 
and tracking e-mails. 
 
 
Fig. 2. (Anonymized) prototype screenshot: Flagging of tracking mails 
This basic functionality was sufficient to conduct our study. The prototype can be 
customized to analyze local mailboxes and could also be extended to integration with 
further web-based mail services. 
 
4.1 Evaluation of the Detection Prototype 
In order to evaluate the prototype, the research team decided to first manually review 
and classify 51 randomly picked e-mails by an intense code review, and then let the 
software prototype run through the classified set of e-mails used as a ground truth or 
test set. We display the results for both tracking approaches separately. Table 6 repre-
sents the Confusion matrix [23] of detecting tracking pixels, while Table 7 refers to 
tracking links. 
Table 6. Confusion matrix for detecting tracking pixels 






0   (FP) 
10 (FN) 
6   (TN) 
 
In order to evaluate the accuracy of the software prototype by a single metric, the 
following established metric for accuracy is applied: Accuracy = (TP+FP) / 
(TP+TN+FN+FP). For the case of tracking pixels: Accuracy = (35+6)/51 = 0.8039. 
 This result illustrates that the software prototype was, compared to the manual 
code review, able to classify 80.39% of test e-mails correctly with respect to tracking 
pixels.  
Table 7. Confusion matrix for detecting tracking links 










For tracking links, Accuracy = (33 + 9)/51 = 0.8235. Therefore, 82.35% of the test 
set e-mails have been classified correctly by the software with respect to tracking 
links. 
5 Results 
Overall, 604 different e-mails have been analyzed. Fig. 3 displays the number of e-
mails received for each industry class. The Trading industry sent most of the emails in 
our sample. The top-3 e-mail senders are: Trading: Electronic with 150 received e-
mails, Trading: All with 125 received e-mails and Trading: Clothes with 71 received 
e-mails. This result may be explained by the fact that the trading industry often 
changes their assortments and as a consequence is highly interested in marketing. 
Analyzing the same e-mails with respect to tracking, 591 of 604 e-mails are using at 
least one tracking approach, i.e., 97.85%. This means only 13 e-mails (2.15%) are not 
using any tracking method. 
 
 
Fig. 3.  E-Mails received, by industry 
Then, the amount of tracking was analyzed in depth. In the 591 e-mails which are 
using tracking approaches, 421 tracking pixel and 428 tracking links were found; in 
total, 849 tracking approaches were identified. This result indicates that many e-mails 
are using more than one tracking approach, for instance a combination of tracking 
links and pixels. On average, 1.41 tracking approaches are included in a single e-mail. 
Fig. 4 displays the results. 
 
 
Fig. 4. Overview of tracking pixels and tracking links 
The next step is the analysis of the different industries and how intensely they are 
using tracking. The following figure illustrates selected industries by their relative 
amount of tracking approaches per e-mail. Some industries are not illustrated because 
the amount of received e-mails was too low and thus the sample was not large enough 
to give a representative view. In general, more than ten e-mails had to be received in 
order to make an assumption about the industry sector. Thus, the industries 
Healthcare, Telecommunication, Automotive, and Energy are not represented. In addi-
tion, the relative amount of tracking approaches of all e-mails within one industry is 
selected. Otherwise, a higher absolute amount of e-mails in one industry would distort 
the results. Fig. 5 illustrates the relative amount of e-mails with tracking links and 
tracking pixels per industry. Both Trading: Clothes and E-Mail Germany sectors dis-
play a 100% ratio for both tracking approaches in our sample. 
Finally, we investigated the locations of the servers that are hosting tracking pixels. 
In total, 268 locations could be determined. Table 8 lists the tracking server locations. 
Of course, the high percentage of tracking servers hosted in Germany is predictable. 
Furthermore, not surprising might be tracking servers in Austria due to the fact that 
several companies combining the German-speaking area to a business group and pool 
services within this area. An interesting result is the high percentage of servers in 
Ireland and the US. 
 
 
Fig. 5. Relative amount of tracking mails per industry 
Table 8. Distribution of tracking server locations (for tracking pixels) 
Country Number of tracking pixels hosted Percentage 
Germany 185 67,27% 
US 51 18,55% 
Ireland 26   9,45% 
Austria 5   1,85% 
Belgium 1   0,36% 
 
Fig. 6 shows the identified locations of the tracking servers we encountered. Our 
study confirms that several outsourcing service providers for e-mail tracking services 
do exist. Motivations for outsourcing could differ widely. One could be the necessity 
of choosing an offsite location for hosting tracking servers when tracking people’s 
behaviour might constitute a violation of local law or privacy. 
 
Fig. 6. Maps of tracking server locations 
6 Limitations and Outlook 
In our study, more than 600 e-mails have been analyzed with respect to the usage of 
tracking methods. In future work, an even broader and larger field of companies could 
be considered for analysis. Another possibility would be to focus on a specific indus-
try and determine the use of e-mail tracking in depth. One could also analyze e-mails 
from different time periods and investigate how techniques and use of e-mail tracking 
changes over time. 
Concerning our detection model, not all theoretical options are included and the 
model, therefore, will not detect some tracking mechanisms or will claim that tracking 
methods are used when in reality this is not the case. The implemented model has an 
accuracy of over 80% for detecting tracking pixels and an accuracy of over 82% for 
detecting tracking links with respect to our test set. Further improvements could be 
reached with optimization of the detection models in order to achieve a higher accura-
cy. In particular, determining whether a URL is personalized is of significant im-
portance. Furthermore, the model could be extended to recognize further tracking 
techniques. For example, a new tracking technique which has been revealed through 
our manual code review is to implement tracking pixels as the background of table 
cells. 
For our analysis, a specialized software prototype was developed. This software 
prototype is integrated into GMail as an email provider. In order to enable end-users 
to flexibly detect tracking techniques in their e-mails, a vendor-independent software 
should be developed. One possibility is to implement different provider-specific APIs 
for a general detection software. Another approach is to develop a plugin for a specif-
ic mail client that would be provider-independent but mail client-dependent. An ex-
ample for this scenario is a plugin for a mail client such as Thunderbird which offers 
powerful SDKs for extension development. 
Another promising direction for future work is to develop methodologies for iden-
tifying similarities between tracking attempts. This would allow to deduce infor-
mation about the software or service used by a company to manage e-mail marketing. 
Clustering of tracking pixels involves the study of schematic similarities and also 
reflects if they are provided by the company itself or by an external provider that can 
be identified, e.g., by a WHOIS query.  
For an end-user, the question of how to protect his or her privacy is of great rele-
vance. Up to now, the most effective protection against tracking links is to not open 
any personalized link in e-mails, and against tracking pixels – to disable the automatic 
download of external images in the e-mail client. However, with in-depth studies of 
tracking servers, corresponding blacklists could support automatic link filtering for 
increased privacy protection. 
7 Conclusion 
Our study shows that both tracking links and tracking pixels are widely used in com-
mercial practice: 97.85% of all e-mails received in this study contained at least one e-
mail tracking method. Concerning different industries, there are business sectors in 
our study where only a few mails but also others where the entirety of messages are 
containing tracking attempts. 
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